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No. 81-611 
GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. 
v. 
SUPERIOR COURT for 
the COUNTY OF NOR-
FOLK (Mass.) State/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: This appeal challenges a Massachusetts statute 
barring the public and the press from portions of criminal tri-
als involving rape or other sexual abuse of a minor. 
FACTS: A Massachusetts statute requires the exclusion of 
the general public (including the press) from the court room at 
a criminal trial "for rape, incest, carnal abuse or other crime 
I.~ ~ul.tlo{ A.f.f}r~) ~0~~ ~,c,~ ~~ R,,c.h~o"'d 'V~w~f-..f~rJ 
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involving sex, where a minor under .eighteen year:fi~e 
person upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have 
been committed." The exclusion is mandatory; no trial court - ~ 
discretion is involved. 
Appt's reporters were barred from the courtroom during the 
trial of a man charged with the forcible rape of three minors.V~~ 
The prosecutor told the trial judge prior to trial that the ~~ --victims did not~n~lnclusion of the press provided that no~ 
photographs, interviews, or articles containing personal infor-
mation were permitted. The criminal defendant and appt both 
---... 
~objected to the exclusion, but the trial court, finding the ~)z~ ~ 
language of the statute to be mandatory, denied the objections 
and closed the trial. The defendant was acquitted of the 
charges before the first appeal of the press exclusion ruling; 
he is no longer involved in the case. 
In its first hearing of the case (Globe I), The Supreme -Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed the trial court's de-
cision, but held that the statute only required exclusion from 
that portion of the trial in which a minor victim was actually 
-------~----------------------------------------------testifying. The court stated that the law gave the trial court 
~
discretion to close other portions of the trial. On appeal, 
this Court vacated the judgment and remanded for further con-
sideration in light of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 
448 u.s. 555 (1980). 
HOLDING BELOW: On remand, the Sup Jud Ct again affirmed. 
The court noted that there was no opinion for the Court in 
Richmond Newspapers, but that all of the opinions of the Jus-
- 3 -
tices in the majority admitted that closure might be required 
in some circumstances. In particular, Justice Stewart's opin-
ion mentioned that "the sensibilities of a youthful prosecution 
witness, for example, might justify similar exclusion in a 
criminal trial for rape •• " 445 u.s. ~:tt 600 n.5. There 
has been a considerable history of exclusion of the public and 
in some cases the press from trials involving rape, especially 
when the victim is a minor. Most appellate courts have upheld 
' 
such exclusions particularly when they only involve closure 
\ 
during the testimony of the victim. There are five significant 
state interests involved here: 1) encouraging minors to report ------- - ... 
sexual offenses, 2) protecting minor victims from humiliation 
and embarrassment, 3) enhancing credibility of juvenile wit-
nesses by avoiding confusion, fright and embarrassment, 4) pro-
moting the administration of justice, and 5) preserving evi-
dence and obtaining convictions. Contrary to appt's conten-
tion, closure need not be evaluated case-by-case. The closure 
hearing itself would have severe psychological costs and even 
the possibility of press coverage might deter victims from re-
porting crimes or agreeing to testify. 
The court noted that this statute is part of the state's 
I( d' ' d d ' ' y ' -tra 1t1onal an accepte sol1c1tousness toward mmors. "It 
would be anomalous indeed if a State Legislature could protect 
juvenile offenders by closed hearings but was deemed to lack 
the power to protect juvenile victims of crime." Given the 
narrow scope of the statute as interpreted, the interests of 
the state outweigh those of the press and its readership. Jus-
- 4 -
tice Wilkins, concurring, would require specific findings by 
the trial court before closure but apparently would not require 
a hearing. 
CONTENTIONS: Appt raises the same contentions raised be-
low and discussed by the state court. Its first argument is 
that criminal trials must be fully open to the press and public 
unless closure in a particular case is the least drastic means 
of accomplishing an overriding governmental interest. Appt 
does not argue ~at closure is never permitted, only that it 
must be justifierd by the facts and circumstances of each par-
ticular case. Richmond Newspapers prohibits closure "[a]bsent 
an overriding interest articulated in findings." 448 u.s. lt 
581. To justify infringement on First Amendment rights, gov-
ernmental action must be closely tailored to the state's inter-
est and must avoid any unneccessary infringement. The inter-
ests identified by the Sup Jud Court do not warrant closure of 
all of the testimony of all minor victinms in all cases. The 
Massachusetts statute is unique in that it requires closure 
rather than merely giving the trial court discretion to close 
the trial. Even Richmond Newspapers involved only the discre-
tionary exclusion of the press and public by a trial judge. 
The paternalistic state interests are insufficient to support 
the blanket rule. The statute is unnecessarily broad because 
it does not provide for a hearing before the trial is closed. 
Every decision rendered since Richmond Newspapers has required 
such a hearing. The hearing need not be elaborate or cumbersome 
and may afford the victim sufficient protection. The state 
- 5 - UJk.e-j t-p' L] ~ 
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1 d . d'. h '~h ~dd' ·. Hl~/-a rea y requ1res an expe 1t1ous eqrlng w en a 1t1on~: por- ~G/ 
tions of the trial are to be closed. ~
The appt's second argument is that closure violates the 
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. The Sup 
Jud Ct did not discuss this issue because it found that appt 
could not raise the defendant's claim. However, the defendant 
himself opposed the exclusion of the public and the press. The 
defendant's rights are "inextricably bound up" with those of 
appt, so appt should be allowed to raise those rights. 
The state's motion to dismiss or affirm reiterates the 
points made by the state court. First, it argues that the appt 
"1. ~I does not have standing to raise the defendant's Sixth Amendment 
claims. Even if the defendant himself were a party to this 
case, the claims would be moot because of the acquittal. The~ 
next contends that the statute, as modified by the state 
court's interpretation, accomodates appts First Amend interests 
-~· and does not raise the problems encountered in Richmond Newspa-
pers. Only a small portion of trials must be closed. All of 
the opinions in Richmond Newspapers acknowledged that closure 
might be justified in some cases. The statute is not void un-
der the overbreadth doctrine. That doctrine does not apply 
here because the statute does not block any expression; it only 
temporarily blocks one source of information. Appt had access)~ 
doctrine did apply, to transcripts of all testimony. If the 
the statute would still be valid because it implements overrid-
ing state concerns in the least restrictive manner. Appt ig-
nores one important interest: in order to encourage victims to 
- 6 -
come forward, the state must be allowed to assure 
vance that they will be absolutely protected from 
Under appt's proposal, there is no certainty of privacy. The 
hearing itself could be stressful and damaging to the vict1 • 
DISCUSSION: The Massachusetts court's determination tha 
ll \ 
appt cannot raise the Sixth Amendment claim of the defendant · 
.... 
seems correct. This might be a much different case if the de-
fendant himself had pursued his objections to the exclusion of 
the public and press, but he did not. Gannett Co. v. 
DePasquale is still good authority for the proposition that the 
press cannot raise the Sixth Amend claims of criminal defen-
dan ts • 
Th s not insubstantial. The sev-
eral Richmond Newspapers opinions seem to contemplate excep-
tions to the rule of press and public inclusion; exclusion of 
the press and public from the courtroom while a minor victim of 
rape is testifying seems a likely candidate for such an excep-
tion. The issue here is whether closure can be mandated by the 
-legislature for the general class of cases or must be decided 
\ .... 
case-by-case after a hearing or at least af~ecific find-
ings. There is dicta in the plurality opinion in Richmond 
Newspapers that at least specific articulated findings are re-
quired. The state claims several strong interests in favor of 
exclusion, one of which supports closure without a hearing or 
findings more specific than that the crime involves a sexual 
offense against a minor: the state argues that if it is to 
encourage minor victims to report sexual offenses, it must 
- 7 -
guarantee protection from public e~posure in advance and not 
merely leave the matter to the discretion of the trial court. 
There is also weight to the argument that if the First Amend-
ment permits closure of the trials of juvenile offenders it 
must also permit protection of juvenile victims from having to 
testify in public and before the press. Appt has pointed to 
several state cases where courts have required hearings before 
allowing closure. See, e.g., State v. Sheppard, A.2d __ __ 
, 42 Conn.L.J. No. 23 at 6 (1980) (evidentiary hearing required 
before press can be excluded from portion of trial in which 
minor rape victim testified): State v. Sinclair, 274 S.E. 2d 
411 (S.C. 1981) {press exclusion during testimony of 9-year-old 
victim of sex crime permissible "after balancing the interests 
of all parties.") These cases do not involve mandatory closure 
statutes, however, and I do not they present a sufficient con-
flict to require oral argument. 
I recommend that the Court affirm. 
There is a response. 
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To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: Globe Newspaper: NO. 81-611 
I think that you can go either way in this case. It 
is clear--and not contested--that the state's interest in 
protecting juvenile victims will in some cases outweigh the 
public's first amendment rights. 
State can exclude the public 
victim's testimony in all cases 
factfindings by the trial judge. 
The question is whether the 
and press from a juvenile 
in the absence of specific 
You have written several concurring and dissenting 
opinions that bear upon this issue. Indeed, you are the 
progenitor of the first amendment right of public/press access 
to trials, prisons, etc. The difficulty with this approach--
as you recognize--is to develop some middle ground where the 
right of access does not turn into a constitutional version of 
the Freedom of Information Act. 
In Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 u.s. 843 
(1974), you argued that the press--as agent of the public--had 
... 
.-
z. 
a first amendment right to newsgathering at a prison. You 
argued that the FBI's absolute ban on press interviews with 
prisoners could not meet the "heavy burden of justification" 
appropriate when a first amendment interest is restricted. 
However, you would not have required a case-by-case 
determination by prison officials: "While I agree • • . that 
the First Amendment requires the Bureau to abandon its 
absolute ban against press intereviews, I do not believe that 
it compels the adoption of a policy of ad hoc balancing of the 
competing interest involved in each request for an interview • 
..• Thus, the Bureau could meet its obligation under the First 
Amendment and protect its legitimate concern for effective 
penal administration by rules drawn to serve both purposes 
without undertaking to make an individual evaluation of every 
intereview request." You suggested that time, place and 
manner restrictions would certainly be appropriate. So would 
some limit on the number of interviews any single inmate might 
give. 
On the basis of your position in Saxbe you could go 
either way depending on how you characterize the regulation 
here. If you characterize the regulation as an "absolute ban" 
on open courtrooms during juvenile testimony--regardless of 
whether the juvenile victim would permit the press to stay--
then you reverse. If you characterize the regulation as the 
sort of rule that reasonably accommodates competing interests-
j. 
-such as you urged the FBI to adopt--then you affirm. It is 
not hard to characterize this rule in non-absolute terms: GLl t 
~ 
only bars the public during the victim's testimony; GD.i t only ~\\ 
applies to juvenile victims in sex crimes;dD it does not block 
eventual release of a transcript @. t does not bar the press 
from directly interviewing the victim at some point. 
In Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 u.s. 368 (1978), 
you concurred, again urging a first amendment approach. You 
suggested that trial judges could order closure of pretrial 
hearings but only after careful weighing of competing 
considerations and after providing the press an opportunity to 
object to closure. Your concurrence can be read as requiring 
a close, case by case consideration by the trial judge--rather 
than permitting any general prohibition such as existed in 
this case. 
I tend to think that just as juvenile trials m~y be 
shut without a case by case determination, so, too, the state 
--..J 
may shut a juvenile victim's testimony in a rape case. 
Requiring the judge to hold a hearing in every case would seem 
to rather defeat the purpose of the law. Moreover, the 
statute is quite narrow as construed by the Supreme Judicial 
Court. On the other hand it can be said--ironically--that 
such a minimal restriction on the press is not likely to 
provide the juvenile victim with any assurance of privacy and 
thus does not serve any genuine state interest. 
) ~ 
~~z. 
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From: Justic 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 81-611 
GLOBE NEWSPAPER COMPANY, APPELLANT v. SU-
PERIOR COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF NORFOLK 
APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 
[May-, 1982] 
JUSTICE BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 16A of Chapter 278 of Massachusetts General 
Laws, 1 as construed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, requires trial judges, at trials for specified sexual of-
fenses involving a victim under the age of 18, to exclude the 
press and general public from the courtroom during the testi-
mony of that victim. The question presented is whether the 
statute thus construed violates the First Amendment as ap-
plied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I 
The case began when appellant, Globe Newspaper Co. 
(Globe), unsuccessfully attempted to gain access to a rape 
trial conducted in the Superior Court for the County of Nor-
folk, Commonwealth of Massachusetts. The criminal de-
fendant in that trial had been charged with the forcible rape 
1 Mass. Gen. Laws, ch. 278, § 16A (West), which provides in pertinent 
part: 
"At the trial of a complaint or indictment for rape, incest, carnal abuse or 
other crime involving sex, where a minor under eighteen years of age is the 
person upon, with or against whom the crime is alleged to have been com-
mitted, ... the presiding justice shall exclude the general public from the 
court room, admitting only such persons as may have a direct interest in 
the case." 
81-611-0PINION 
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and forced unnatural rape of three girls who were minors at 
the time of trial-two sixteen years of age and one seven-
teen. In April1979, during hearings on several preliminary 
motions, the trial judge ordered the courtroom closed. 2 Be-
fore the trial began, Globe moved that the court revoke this 
closure order, hold hearings on any future such orders, and 
permit appellant to intervene "for the limited purpose of as-
serting its rights to access to the trial and hearings on related 
preliminary motions." App. 12a-14a. The trial court de-
nied Globe's motions, 3 relying on Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 
278, § 16A (West), and ordered the exclusion of the press and 
general public from the courtroom during the trial. The de-
fendant immediately objected to that exclusion order, and the 
prosecution stated for purposes of the record that the order 
was issued on the court's "own motion and not at the request 
of the Commonwealth." App. 18a. 
Within hours after the court had issued its exclusion order, 
Globe sought injunctive relief from a justice of the Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts. 4 The next day the justice 
conducted a hearing, at which the Commonwealth, "on behalf 
of the victims," waived "whatever rights it [might] have 
[had] to exclude the press." App. 28a. 5 Nevertheless, 
2 "The court caused a sign marked 'closed' to be placed on the courtroom 
door, and court personnel turned away people seeking entry." Globe 
Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court , --Mass.--,--, 401 N.E. 2d 360, 
362-363 (1980) (footnote omitted). 
3 The court refused to permit Globe to file its motion to intervene and 
explicitly stated that it would not act on Globe's other motions. App. 
17a-18a. 
4 Globe's request was contained in a petition for extraordinary relief filed 
pursuant to Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 211, § 3 (West). 
• The Commonwealth's representative stated: 
"[O]ur position before the trial judge [was], and it is before this Court, that 
in some circumstances a trial judge, where the defendant is asserting his 
right to a constitutional, public trial, . .. may consider that as outweighing 
the otherwise legitimate statutory interests, particularly where the Com-
monwealth [acts] on behalf of the victims, and this is literally on behalf of 
81-611-0PINION 
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Globe's request for relief was denied. Before Globe ap-
pealed to the full court, the rape trial proceeded and the de-
fendant was acquitted. 
Nine months after the conclusion of the criminal trial, the 
Supreme Judicial Court issued its judgment, dismissing 
Globe's appeal. Although the court held that the case was 
rendered moot by completion of the trial, it nevertheless 
stated that it would proceed to the merits, because the issues 
raised by Globe were "significant and troublesome, and . . . 
'capable of repetition yet evading review."' -- Mass. 
--, --, 401 N.E. 2d 360, 362, quoting Southern Pacific 
Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). As a statu-
tory matter, the court agreed with Globe that § 16A did not 
require the exclusion of the press from the entire criminal 
trial. The provision was designed, the court determined, "to 
encourage young victims of sexual offenses to come forward; 
once they have come forward, the statute is designed to pre-
serve their ability to testify by protecting them from undue 
psychological harm at trial." --Mass., at--, 401 N.E. 
2d, at 369. Relying on these twin purposes, the court con-
the victims in the sense that they were consulted fully by the prosecutor in 
this case. The Commonwealth waives whatever rights it may have to ex-
clude the press." App. 28a. 
Some time after the trial began, the prosecuting attorney informed the 
judge at a lobby conference that she had "spoke[n] with each of the victims 
regarding ... excluding the press." App. 48a. The prosecuting attorney 
indicated that the victims had expressed some "privacy concerns" that 
were based on "their own privacy interests, as well as the fact that there 
are grandparents involved with a couple of these victims." Ibid. But ac-
cording to the prosecuting attorney, the victims "wouldn't object to the 
press being included" if "it were at all possible to obtain a guarantee" that 
the press would not attempt to interview them or publish their names, pho-
tographs, or any personal information. Ibid. In fact, their names were 
already part of the public record. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court,-- Mass.--,-, 423 N.E. 2d 773, 780 (1981). It is not clear 
from the record, however, whether or not the victims were aware of this 
fact at the time of their discussions with the prosecuting attorney. 
81-611-0PINION 
4 GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
eluded that § 16A required the closure of sex-offense trials 
only during the testimony of minor victims; during other por-
tions of such trials, closure was "a matter within the judge's 
sound discretion." !d., at-.-, 401 N.E. 2d, at 371. The 
court did not pass on Globe's contentions that it had a right to 
attend the entire criminal trial under the First and Sixth 
Amendments, noting that it would await this Court's deci-
sion-then pending-in Richmond Newspapers , Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 448 U. S. 555 (1980). 6 
Globe then appealed to this Court. Following our decision 
in Richmond Newspapers, we vacated the judgment of the 
Supreme Judicial Court, and remanded the case for further 
consideration in light of that decision. 449 U. S. 894 (1980). 
On remand, the Supreme Judicial Court, adhering to its 
earlier construction of § 16A, considered whether our deci-
sion in Richmond Newspapers required the invalidation of 
the mandatory-closure rule of § 16A. -- Mass. --, 423 
N.E. 2d 773 (1981). 7 In analyzing the First Amendment 
issue,8 the court recognized that there is "an unbroken tradi-
tion of openness" in criminal trials. I d., at 778. But the 
court discerned "at least one notable exception" to this tradi-
6 Justice Quirico dissented, being of the view that the mandatory-closure 
rule of § 16A was not limited to the testimony of minor victims, but was 
applicable to the entire trial. 
7 The court again noted that the First Amendment issue arising from the 
closure of the then-completed trial was "capable of repetition yet evading 
review." --Mass., at--, n. 4, 423 N.E. 2d, at 775, n. 4, quoting 
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). But in 
contrast to the view it had taken in its prior opinion, supra, at 3, the court 
held that the case was not moot because of this possibility of repetition 
without opportunity for review. 
8 The court found it unnecessary to consider Globe's argument that the 
mandatory-closure rule violated the Sixth Amendment rights of the crimi-
nal defendant who had been acquitted in the rape trial. Those Sixth 
Amendment rights, the court stated, were "personal rights" that, "at least 
in the context of this case, [could] only be asserted by the original criminal 
defendant." -Mass. , at-, 423 N.E. 2d, at 776 (footnote omitted). 
81-611-0PINION 
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tion: "In cases involving sexual assaults, portions of trials 
have been closed to some segments of the public, even. when 
the victim was an adult." Ibid. The court also emphasized 
that § 16A's mandatory-closure rule furthered "genuine State 
interests," which the court had identified in its earlier deci-
sion as underlying the statutory provision. These interests, 
the court stated, "would be defeated if a case-by-case deter-
mination were used." I d., at 779. While acknowleging that 
the mandatory-closure requirement results in a "temporary 
diminution" of the "the public's knowledge about these 
trials," the court did not think "that Richmond Newspapers 
require[d] the invalidation of the requirement, given the stat-
ute's narrow scope in an area of traditional sensitivity to the 
needs of victims." I d., at 781. The court accordingly dis-
missed Globe's appeal. 9 
Globe again sought review in this Court. We noted proba-
ble jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1981). For the reasons 
that follow, we reverse, and hold that the mandatory-closure 
rule contained in § 16A violates the First Amendment. 10 
II 
In this Court, Globe challenges that portion of the trial 
court's order, approved by the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, that holds that § 16A requires, under all cir-
cumstances, the exclusion of the press and general public 
during the testimony of a minor victim in a sex-offense trial. 
Because the entire order expired with the completion of the 
rape trial at which the defendant was acquitted, we must con-
sider at the outset whether a live controversy remains. 
9 Justice Wilkins filed a concurring opinion in which he expressed con-
cern whether a statute constitutionally could require closure "without spe-
cific findings by the judge that the closing is justified by overriding or 
countervailing interests of the Commonwealth." - Mass., at -, 423 
N.E. 2d, at 782. 
'
0 We therefore have no occasion to consider Globe's additional argument 
that the provision violates the Sixth Amendment. 
81-611-0PINION 
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Under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution, our jurisdiction ex-
tends only to actual cases or. controversies. Nebraska Press 
Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 546 (1976). "The Court has 
recognized, however, that jurisdiction is not necessarily de-
feated simply because the order attacked has expired, if the 
underlying dispute between the parties is one 'capable of rep-
etition, yet evading review."' Ibid., quoting Southern Pa-
cific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U. S. 498, 515 (1911). 
The controversy between the parties in this case is indeed 
"capable of repetition, yet evading review." It can reason-
ably be assumed that Globe, as the publisher of a newspaper 
serving the Boston metropolitan area, will someday be sub-
jected to another order relying on§ 16A's mandatory-closure 
rule. See Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 
377-378 (1979); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U. S. 555, 563 (1980) (plurality opinion). And because crimi-
nal trials are typically of "short duration," ibid., such an 
order will likely "evade review, or at least considered plenary 
review in this Court." Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 
supra, at 547. We therefore conclude that the controversy 
before us is not moot within the meaning of Art. III, and turn 
to the merits. 
III 
A 
The Court's recent decision in Richmond Newspapers 
firmly established for the first time that the press and gen-
eral public have a constitutional right of access to criminal 
trials. Although there was no opinion of the Court in that 
case, seven Justices recognized that this right of access is em-
bodied in the First Amendment, and applied to the States 
through the Fourteenth Amendment. I d., at 558-581 (plu-
rality opinion); id., at 584-598 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in 
the judgment); id., at 598-601 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
judgment); id., at 601-604 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in the 
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judgment). 11 
Of course, this right of access to criminal trials is not ex-
plicitly mentioned in terms in the First Amendment. 12 But 
we have long eschewed any "narrow, literal conception" of 
the Amendment's terms, NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 
430 (1963), for the Framers were concerned with broad prin-
ciples, and wrote against a background of shared values and 
practices. The First Amendment is thus broad enough to 
encompass those rights that, while not unambiguously enu-
merated in the very terms of the Amendment, are nonethe-
less necessary to the enjoyment of other First Amendment 
rights or are implicit in the very structure of self-government 
established by the Constitution. Richmond Newspapers, 
Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S., at 579-580, and n. 16 (plurality 
opinion) (citing cases); id., at 587-588, and n. 4 (BRENNAN, 
J., concurring in the judgment). 13 Underlying the First 
Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common 
understanding that "a major purpose of that Amendment was 
to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs," 
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U. S. 214, 218 (1966). By offering 
such protection, the First Amendment serves to ensure that 
the individual citizen can effectively participate in and con-
tribute to our republican system of self-government. See 
"JUSTICE POWELL took no part in the consideration or decision of Rich· 
mond Newspapers. But he had indicated previously in a concurring opin-
ion in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368 (1979), that he viewed the 
First Amendment as conferring on the press a right of access to criminal 
trials. !d. , at 397-398. 
12 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, 
or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. Const. , 
Arndt. 1. 
13 See also Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U. S. 1, 30--38 (1978) (STEVENS, 
J., dissenting); Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S. 843, 861-864 
(197 4) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 
81-611-0PINION 
8 GLOBE NEWSPAPER CO. v. SUPERIOR COURT 
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88, 95 (1980); Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U. S., at 587-588 (BREN-
NAN, J., concurring in the judgment). See also id., at 575 
(plurality opinion) (the "expressly guaranteed freedoms" of 
the First Amendment "share a common core purpose of as-
suring freedom of communication on matters relating to the 
functioning of government"). Thus to the extent that the 
First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal 
trials, it is to ensure that this constitutionally protected "dis-
cussion of governmental affairs" is an informed one. 
Two features of the criminal justice system, emphasized in 
the various opinions in Richmond Newspapers, together 
serve to explain why a right of access to criminal trials in 
particular is properly afforded protection by the First 
Amendment. First, the criminal trial historically has been 
open to the press and general public. "[A]t the time when 
our organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and 
in England had long been presumptively open." Richmond 
Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 569 (plurality opin-
ion). And since that time, the presumption of openness has 
remained secure. Indeed, at the time of this Court's deci-
sion in In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257 (1948), the presumption 
was so solidly grounded that the Court was "unable to find a 
single instance of a criminal trial conducted in camera in any 
federal, state, or municipal court during the history of this 
country." Id., at 266 (footnote omitted). This uniform rule 
of openness has been viewed as significant in constitutional 
terms not only "because the Constitution carries the gloss of 
history," but also because "a tradition of accessibility implies 
the favorable judgment of experience." Richmond N ewspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 589 (BRENNAN, J., concur-
ring in the judgment). 14 
14 Appellee argues that criminal trials have not always been open to the 
press and general public during the testimony of minor sex victims. Brief 
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Second, the right of access to criminal trials plays a par-
ticularly significant role in the functioning of the judicial 
process and the government as a whole. Public scrutiny of a 
criminal trial enhances the quality and safeguards the integ-
rity of the factfinding process, with benefits to both the de-
fendant and to society as a whole. 16 Moreover, public access 
to the criminal trial fosters an appearance of fairness, 
thereby heightening public respect for the judicial process. 16 
And in the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials 
permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon 
the judicial process-an essential component in our structure 
of self-government. 17 In sum, the institutional value of the 
for Appellee 13-22. Even if appellee is correct in this regard, but see 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368,423 (1979) (BLACKMUN, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), the argument is unavailing. In 
Richmond Newspapers, the Court discerned a First Amendment right of 
access to criminal trials based in part on the recognition that as a general 
matter criminal trials have long been presumptively open. Whether the 
First Amendment right of access to criminal trials can be restricted in the 
context of any particular criminal trial, such as a murder trial (the setting 
for the dispute in Richmond Newspapers) or a rape trial, depends not on 
the historical openness of that type of criminal trial but rather on the state 
interests assertedly supporting the restriction. See Part III-B infra. 
15 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc . v. Virginia, 448 U. S., at 569 (plural-
ity opinion); id., at 596-597 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979); id., at 428-429 
(BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
16 See Levine v. United States, 362 U. S. 610, 616 (1960); In re Oliver, 333 
U. S. 257, 268-271 (1948); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U. S., at 570-571 (plurality opinion); id., at 595 (BRENNAN, J., concurring 
in the judgment); Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, supra, at 428-429 (BLACK-
MUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
17 See Richmond Newspapers, Inc . v. Virginia, 448 U.S., at 570-571 
(plurality opinion); id., at 596 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment); 
Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S., at 394 (CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, 
concurring); id., at 428 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). 
/~ 
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open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and experience. 
B 
Although the right of access to criminal trials is of constitu-
tional stature, it is not absolute. See Richmond Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Virginia, supra, at 581, n. 18 (plurality opinion); 
Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S., at 570. But the 
circumstances under which the press and public can be 
barred from a criminal trial are limited; the State's justifica-
tion in denyjng access must be a wei ht one. Wlier"e, as in 
the present case, the tate attempts to deny the right of ac-
cess in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, 
it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compel-
ling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored toserve 
th~ g., Brown v. Hartlage, -- U. S. 
--, -- (1982); Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 
U. S. 97, 101-103 (1979); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 
438 (1963). See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, supra, at 580-581 (plurality opinion). 18 We now con-
sider the state interests advanced to support Massachusetts' 
mandatory. rule barring press and public access to criminal . 
sex-offense trials during the testimony of minor victims. 
IV 
The state interests asserted to support § 16A, though artic-
ulated in various ways, are reducible to two: the protection of 
minor victims of sex crimes from further trauma and 
18 Of course, limitations on the right of access that resemble "time, place, 
and manner" restrictions on protected speech, see Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, 427 U. S. 50, 63, n. 18 (1976), would not be subjected to 
such strict scrutiny. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 
U. S., at 581-582, n. 18 (plurality opinion); id., at 598, n. 23 (BRENNAN, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id., at 600 (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
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embarassment; and the encouragement of such victims to 
come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner. 19 
We consider these interests in turn. 
We agree with respondent that the first interest-safe-
guarding the physical and psychologreal well-being of a mi-
nor 20-is a compelling one. But as compelling as that inter-
est is, ~a mandatory-closure rule, for it is 
clear that t e circums ances of tlie partlcu ar case may affect 
the significance of the interest. A trial court can determine 
on a case-b -case basis whether c~o pro-
tect the welf o a m or victim. 2 Among t e factors to be 
weighed are the minor victim's age, psychological maturity, 
and understanding, the nature of the crime, the desires of the 
victim, 22 and the interests of parents and relatives. Section 
19 In its opinion following our remand, the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts described the interests in the following terms: 
"(a) to encourage minor victims to come forward to institute complaints and 
give testimony ... ; (b) to protect minor victims of certain sex crimes from 
public degradation, humiliation, demoralization, and psychological damage 
. .. ; (c) to enhance the likelihood of credible testimony from such minors, 
free of confusion, fright, or embellishment; (d) to promote the sound and 
orderly administration of justice ... ; (e) to preserve evidence and obtain 
just convictions." --Mass., at--, 423 N.E. 2d, at 779. 
20 It is important to note that in the context of § 16A, the measure of the 
State's interest lies not in the extent to which minor victims are injured by 
testifying, but rather in the incremental injury suffered by testifying in the 
presence of the press and the general public. 
21 Indeed, the plurality opinion in Richmond Newspapers suggested that 
individualized determinations are always required before the right of ac-
cess may be denied: "Absent an overriding interest articulated in findings, 
the trial of a criminal case must be open to the public." 448 U. S., at 581 
(footnote omitted). 
22 "[I]f the minor victim wanted the public to know precisely what a hei-
nous crime the defendant had committed, the imputed legislative justifica-
tions for requiring the closing of the trial during the victim's testimony 
would in part, at least, be inapplicable." Globe Newspaper Co. v. Supe-
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16A, in contrast, requires closure even if the victim does not 
seek the exclusion of the press and general public, and would 
not suffer injury by their presence. 23 In the case before us, 
for example, the names of the minor victims were already in 
the public record, 24 and the record indicates that the victims 
may have been willing to testify despite the presence of the 
press. 25 If the trial court had been permitted to exercise its 
discretion, closure might well have been deemed unnec-
essary. In short, § 16A cannot be viewed as a narrowly tai-
lored means of accommodating the State's asserted interest: 
That interest could be served just as well by requiring the 
trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis whether the 
State's legitimate concern for the well-being of the minor vic-
tim necessitates closure. Such an approach ensures that the 
constitutional right of the press and public to gain access to 
criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary 
rior Court, - Mass. - , --, 423 N.E. 2d 773, 782 (Wilkins, J., 
concurring). 
23 It appears that while other States have statutory or constitutional pro-
visions that would allow a trial judge to close a criminal sex-offense trial { 
during the testimony of a minor victim, no other State has a mandatory 
provision excluding both the press and general public during such testi-
mony. See, e. g., Ala. Code § 12-21-202 (1975); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.3 
(1973); Ga. Code § 81-1006 (1956 Rev.); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 15:469.1 
(West 1981); Miss. Const., Art. 3, §26; N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §632-A:8 
(Supp. 1979); N.Y. J ud. Law § 4 (McKinney 1968); N.C. Gen. Stat. 
§ 15-166 (Supp. 1981); N.D. Cent. Code§ 27-01-02 (1974); Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-7-4 (1953); Vt. Stat. Ann. , Tit. 12, § 1901 (1973); Wis. Stat. § 970.03(4) 
(Supp. 1981). See also Fla. Stat. § 918.16 (Supp. 1982) (providing for man-
datory exclusion of general public but not press during testimony of minor 
victims). Of course, we intimate no view regarding the constitutionality 
of these state statutes. 
24 The Court has held that the government may not impose sanctions for 
the publication of the names of rape victims lawfully obtained from the pub-
lic record. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469 (1975). See 
also Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U. S. 97 (1979). 
u See supra, at 2-3, and n. 5. 
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to protect the State's interest. 26 
Nor can § 16A be justified on the basis of the Common-
wealth's S£COnd asserted interest-the encouragement of 
minor victims of sex crimes to come forward and provide ac-
curate testimony. The Commonwealth has offered no em-
pirical sup~ort for the claim that the rule of automatic closure 
contained m § 16A will lead to an increase in the number of 
minor sex victims coming forward and cooperating with state 
authorities. '1:1 . Not only is the claim speculative in empirical 
terms, but it is also open to serious question' as a matter of 
logic and common sense. Although§ 16A bars the press and 
general public from the courtroom during the testimony of ( 
minor sex victims, the press is not denied access to the tran-
script, court personnel, or any other possible source that 
could provide an account of the minor victim's testimony. _ 
26 Of course, for a case-by-case approach to be meaningful, represent- \ 
atives of the press and general public "must be given an opportunity to be 
heard on the question of their exclusion." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 
U. S. 368, 401 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). This does not mean, how-
ever, that for purposes of this inquiry the court cannot protect the minor 
victim by denying these representatives the opportunity to confront or 
cross-examine the victim, or by denying them access to sensitive details 
concerning the victim and the victim's future testimony. Such discretion 
is consistent with the traditional authority of trial judges to conduct in cam-
era conferences. SeeRichmondNewspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S., 
at 598, n. 23 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in the judgment). Without such 
trial court discretion, a State's interest in safeguarding the welfare of the Vtn/ 
minor victim, determined in an individual case to merit some form of clo- O 
sure, would be defeated before it could ever be brought to bear. 
'i:1 To the extent that it is suggested that, quite apart from encouraging 
minor victims to testify, § 16A improves the quality and credibility of testi-
mony, the suggestion also is speculative. And while closure may have 
such an effect in particular cases, the Court has recognized that, as a gen-
eral matter, "[ o}penness in court proceedings may improve the quality of 
testimony." Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U. S. 368, 383 (1979) (em-
phasis added). In the absence of any showing that closure would improve 
the quality of testimony of all minor sex victims, the State's interest cer-
tainly cannot justify a mandatory-closure rule. 
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Thus § 16A cannot prevent the press from publicizing the 
substance of a minor victim's testimony, as well as his or her 
identity. If the Commonwealth's interest in encouraging mi-
nor victims to come forward depends on keeping such mat-
ters secret, § 16A hardly advances that interest in an effec-
tive manner. And even if § 16A effectively advanced the 
State's interest, it is doubtful that the interest would be suffi-
cient to overcome the constitutional attack, for that same in-
terest could be relied on to support an array of mandatory-
closure rules designed to encourage victims to come forward: 
Surely it cannot be suggested that minor victims of sex 
crimes are the only crime victims who, because of publicity 
attendant to criminal trials, are reluctant to come forward 
and testify. The State's argument based on this interest 
therefore proves too much, and runs contrary to the very 
foundation of the right of access recognized in Richmond 
Newspapers: namely, "that a presumption of openness in-
heres in the very nature of a criminal trial under our system 
of justice." 448 U. S., at 573 (plurality opinion). 
v 
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that § 16A, as con-
strued by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, vio-
lates the First Amendment to the Constitution. 28 Accord-
ingly, the judgment of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court is 
Reversed. 
28 We emphasize that our holding is a narrow one: that a rule of manda-
tory closure respecting the testimony of minor sex victims is constitution-
ally infirm. In individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances, the 
First Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion from 
the courtroom of the press and general public during the testimony of mi-
nor sex-offense victims. But a mandatory rule, requiring no particular-
ized determinations in individual cases, is unconstitutional. 
------ ··--· ---- - -
CHAMBERS OF" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
RE: 
~u.prtmt <!Jourl tTf tqt ~lt .:%taftg 
~u!pnghtn. ~· QJ. 2.0,?Jt~ 
May 24, 19~ 
81-611 - Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for 
the County of Norfolk 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
In due course I will circulate a dissent. 
Regards, 
CHAM B ERS OF" 
~uvrtmt ~ourt of tltt ~b j;tatts 
'IDasJringtcn. IJ. ~· 20,?Jt-~ 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL May 24, 1982 
Re: No. 81-611 - Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior 
Court for the County of Norfolk 
Dear.Bill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
cf/1A. . 
• 
T.M. 
Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
dfl 05/24/82 
To: Justice Powell 
From: David 
Re: Globe Newspapers, No. 81-611 
I think that Justice Brennan has done a good job in 
this case and that you can join the opinion. 
You may remember that you and I did not agree on 
this case. I still think that the State may take the position 
that it wishes to protect all minors from courtroom publicity-
-even those minors who would not object to the public's 
presence. I'm not sure why the state must delegate the 
question to a judge. And I'm concerned that some juveniles 
might not seem to care about the publicity, but find 
testifying to be a much more traumatic event than they had 
expected. 
But I guess it's a balance of values and so long as 
an individual judge can still exclude the press and public in 
individual cases, I suppose that juvenile victims will be 
adequately protected on the whole. 
Perhaps you might ask Justice 
saying that nothing in the opinion 
proceedings which traditionally have 
public. 
Brennan to add a note 
pertains to juvenile 
not been open to the 
CHAMBERS 0~ 
..§nprtttU <!Jo-url o-f tfrt ~tb ..§hdt.s' 
~1tinghm. ~. <!f. 2llc?>I-~ 
JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
May 25, 1982 
Re: 81-611 - Globe Newspaper co. v. 
Superior Court for the County ·of Norfolk 
Dear Bill, 
... .. 
I am satisfied with your opinion and 
join it except for the words "or are implicit 
in the very structure of self-government 
established by the Constitution" in the 
middle of page 7 and except for note 13 on 
the same page. Perhaps these items are not 
critical to your opinion. If they are, I 
shall indicate my disagreement. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Brennan 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
May 25, l_q82 
I 
"'--
81-611 Globe Newspaper Company v. Superior Court 
near Rill: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
,Just ice Brenncm 
lfp/ss 
cc: ~he Conference 
?" ... _ .... ~> ..... ·•· .. -· 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
~uprenu Q}Ultr'!"iff tift ~tb ~ffig 
.rut!pttgLm. :!IJ. <!J. 20&T.l!~ 
June 10, 1982 
Re: No. 81-611 Globe Newspaper Company v. Superior 
Court for the County of Norfolk 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely,~ 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
· .. 
'. 
) 
) 
T
H
E
 C
. J. 
W
.J. B
. 
B
. R
. W
. 
T. M
. 
H
. A
. B
. 
L
. F
. P. 
W
.H
.R
. 
J.P
. S. 
S
.D
. O
'C
. 
t.J I-'),/ P
 1
-
/ 
~
~
 
t
4
~
 
~
 c,)»tJ 
~b!~/> ~
 !J~(J rUJ&~ 
~
t
J
9
~
 
~
~
~
 ~
~
~
 
~~-y<f/F -v 
s-/1-<~If z.-
6 l~i/t -v
 
t/t7
/fv
 
t/f/P
,_
 
C
r
,
.
.
v
~
 
S /v(/t-v 
,;/6/tf-y 
~
~
· 
;{;;,~ 0AfJ k
l-
b .. ~
 M
;
~
 
"
2
,.-y
.../f4
.d
 
c!r?/~'"1--
a I 
r· 
{g/J7/f~ 
I' 
1--14-
I 
reI q(tY
' 
lo /;tt/f]/ 
I 
'It r;/ )-
·,
~
4
 
~
~
4
 
&
/v
-1
/f-v
 
I 
~ {to/Yv 
i}-n~ ~
 
I 
'(l{l~v 
I 
\ 
3
~
4
 
1 
~r,1/f-v 
I I I 
l(~ J--;+ff 
I 
. ) 
I 
~f .... ,frv 
I I 
/ 
I I I I 
8
1
-6
1
1
 
G
 1'-obe 
N
ew
sp
a )e
r 
v
. 
S
u
p
e 
io
r 
C
o
u
rt 
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
